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REMEDIES FOR DETAINEES: THE IMPACT 
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON 
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES 
 
 
ARZOO RAJANI* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The United States Department of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (hereinafter ―ICE‖) is one of the 
largest branches of the Department of Homeland Security and 
its mission ―is to protect the security of the American people 
and homeland by vigilantly enforcing the nation‘s 
immigration and customs laws.‖1 The Office of Detention 
and Removal Operations (hereinafter ―DRO‖) is one of the 
four operational divisions of ICE whose mission is to 
―identify and apprehend illegal aliens, fugitive aliens, and 
criminal aliens, to manage them while in custody and to 
enforce orders of removal from the United States.‖2 Prior to 
the 1980s, it was highly unusual for the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (hereinafter ―INS‖) to hold large scale 
detention of legal or illegal aliens and the conventional policy 
was to exclude undocumented aliens seeking residence at the 
border or deporting those aliens who had crossed into the 
                                                          
*  J.D. and MA in International Relations, St. Mary‘s University 
School of Law, 2011; BA, University of Texas at Dallas, 2005. The 
author would also like to thank her family and friends for their never-
ending love and support. 
1
  U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2009). With 
over 19,000 employees in over 400 offices, ICE plays an integral part in 
the defense of this nation.  Id.  By using advance technology, ICE serves 
various law enforcement agencies on federal, state, and local levels.  Id.   
2
  U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro (last visited Dec. 19, 2009).  One of the 
responsibilities of this department is to develop and maintain a system of 
processing aliens through immigration courts and as well as enforcing 
their removal.  Id.  
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United States illegally.
3
 Today, many immigrants end up in 
detention centers because of random raids at worksites, 
private residences, or stops for civil violations. INS contracts 
out to various local jails for the care and control of these 
detainees in their custody, making immigrant detainees one 
of the ―fastest growing segment[s] of the jail population in 
the United States.‖4 
 Even though these detainees have not committed any 
crimes, INS detention centers treat them like criminals by 
requiring them to wear prison uniforms, spend time in their 
cells, transporting them in handcuffs, strip searching them, 
denying them basic medical services and/or disciplining them 
brutally for not following prison rules a result of detainees‘ 
poor English comprehension.
5
 Since detainees are granted 
fewer due process rights than American prisoners, many 
times these detainees are not even appointed legal counsel 
unless they can afford it.
6
  
 Regardless of their legal status, immigrant detainees have 
certain basic rights in the United States which flow from the 
U.S. Constitution such as a right to counsel,
7
 a right to due 
                                                          
3
  TERESA A. MILLER, The Impact of Mass Incarceration on 
Immigration Policy, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 214, 214 (Marc Mauer & Meda 
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (mentioning other alternatives to detention of 
aliens).  Aliens, whether legal or illegal, had options such as bail, ―release 
on one‘s own recognizance‖, and various other forms of relief other than 
detention.  Id.  Even ―[a]liens who were legally residing in the United 
States but who had committed acts subjecting them to deportation 
likewise had options other than detention.‖  Id.   
4
  Id. In 1994, there were approximately fifty-five hundred detainees 
held in the INS custody.  Id.  However, this number tripled to 16,000 in 
1997 and rose to approximately 20,000 detainees by 2001.  Id.   
5
  Id. Most detainees‘ only crime is that they came into United States 
without proper documentation.  Id. at 214.  Many times, aliens seeking 
asylum are detained as well as those immigrants who might have 
overstayed their visa.  Id.   
6
  Id. at 215.  In fact, it has been reported that merely 11 percent of 
immigrant detainees receive any legal representation.  Id.   
7
  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides certain protections to 
defendants in criminal trials. However, the Sixth 
212 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
process,
8
 a right to equal protection under the law,
9
 and 
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.
10
 However, 
                                                                                                                       
Amendment does not apply to deportation proceedings, 
which are considered civil actions.  All Bivens actions 
involving defects in a deportation proceeding should be 
brought under the Fifth Amendment rather than the 
Sixth Amendment.  Most Sixth Amendment cases in the 
detainee context pertain to the right of access to the 
courts.   
 
A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS 
or Other Law Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property 
Damage or Loss, III 6-7, 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (citations omitted). 
8
  U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .‖). 
 
The Supreme Court has also recognized a Bivens cause 
of action arising from the Fifth Amendment‘s due 
process clause.  What is due process?  Due process 
generally requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.  Therefore, an administrative hearing or a court 
proceeding may be required before federal officers take 
some actions against detainees.   Also, in some cases, 
detainees must be provided with an opportunity to 
complain … about an officer‘s action.  Whether a due 
process claim will be successful… can be answered by 
asking … were the officer‘s actions negligent?   
 
If yes: money damages may NOT be collected under 
Bivens.  The reason… negligent conduct by a 
government official, even though causing injury, does 
NOT constitute a deprivation under the Due Process 
Clause.  A detainee may, however, be able to sue the 
United States, in accordance with state tort law, under 
the FTCA. If no: the plaintiff may be able to win and 
recover monetary compensation under Bivens even if 
the actions were random and unauthorized.  
Administrative situations potentially violating the Due 
Process Clause: (1) Complaints never resolved; (2) 
Ineffective procedures for bringing complaints; (3) 
Improper disciplinary procedures; and if (4) Pay for 
labor is delayed.  
A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS 
or Other Law Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property 
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many of these rights are violated regularly within the 
immigration detention centers and in fact; immigration 
experts have described the conditions within the detention 
system as ―the worst of all worlds.‖11 In particular, medical 
rights by ICE/DRO standard call for detainees to have access 
to a broad range of medical services including diagnosis and 
                                                                                                                       
Damage or Loss, III 4-5, 33-34 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (citations omitted). 
 
The Due Process Clause actions additionally includes claims that 
revolve around issues of Equal Protection such as: 
 
A plaintiff must allege that he or she was treated 
differently than other detainees on the basis of some 
impermissible factor, such as race, sex, or religion.  
 
Equal Protection Clause/Due Process Clause claims 
require that the plaintiff prove three elements: 
1. He was treated differently than other prisoners based 
on some characteristic. 
2. The characteristic was not an acceptable basis for 
discriminating between inmates, e.g., race, sex, or 
religion.  
3. Because of the differential treatment, he suffered 
some injury.  
 
Id.   
9
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖). 
10
 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS 
Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement 
Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, III 7,  
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (―A detainee may make an Eighth Amendment 
claim only if she was convicted of a crime and spent time in prison.‖). 
11
 Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/us/politics/04immig.html.  The 
immigration director of the National Council of La Raza stated ―[w]e 
understand the need for sensible enforcement, but that does not mean 
expanding programs that often led to civil rights violations.‖  Id.  The 
governor of Arizona, Ms. Napolitano stated that she would not call off 
worksite or home raids but will continue looking for effective ways to do 
it.  Id.   
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treatment.
12
 This standard is violated regularly and many 
detainees have problems obtaining needed medical care.
13
 
Most frequently, detainees‘ medical concerns include dental 
problems, not receiving proper medication, or complaints of 
severe pain are often minimized and dismissed.
14
  
 This comment examines the impact of the Ninth Circuit‘s 
holding in medical neglect cases and whether the Second 
Circuit made an error. To examine this issue, it must first be 
understood what the factual and legal background is 
concerning each case, the detainee‘s medical rights and the 
types of actions they can bring against government 
employees. After examining the law, the Second Circuit‘s 
holding is then compared with the Ninth Circuit‘s holding. 
Finally, this comment argues why the Supreme Court should 
affirm the Ninth Circuit‘s holding. 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND FOR CASTANEDA AND CUOCO 
CASES 
 
One such case medical neglect case is that of Francisco 
Castaneda, an immigrant detainee who developed terminal 
penile cancer and had his penis amputated because medical 
personnel refused to provide him with a biopsy during his 
nearly eleven-month detention by ICE.
15
 Castaneda entered 
                                                          
12
  U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE/DRO Detention 
Standard: Medical Care, 1-3 (Dec. 2, 2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/PBNDS/pdf/medical_care.pdf. 
13
  Detention Watch Network, Conditions in Immigration Detention – 
ICE Detention Standards, 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2383 (last visited June 20, 
2010). 
14
  Id.   
15
  Henry Weinstein, Feds‘ actions ‗beyond cruel‘, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/13/local/me-cruel13. The U.S. 
District Judge allowed Castaneda‘s family to bring forth a claim and seek 
financial damages from the government.  Id.  The Judge ―blasted public 
health officials‘ ‗attempt to sidestep responsibility for what appears to be . 
. . one of the most, if not the most, egregious‘ violations of the 
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment that ‗the 
court has ever encountered.‘‖  Id.   
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the San Diego Correctional Facility under ICE custody on 
March 27, 2006 and immediately informed the medical 
personnel that a lesion on his penis was growing painful, 
bleeding and exuding discharge.
16
 Castaneda thereafter met 
with the physician‘s assistant who recommended a urology 
consultation and biopsy after an examination, noting of 
Castaneda‘s medical history of genital warts and family 
history of cancer.
17
 
 Castaneda was not provided an outside consultation until 
June 7, 2006, more than two months after he entered ICE 
custody.
18
 On that date Castaneda met with an oncologist 
who determined that his symptoms required an urgent 
diagnosis and treatment, including a biopsy.
19
 Castaneda‘s 
treating physician at the detention center determined that the 
biopsy was an elective outpatient procedure and rejected it 
even though she admitted that a biopsy was medically 
necessary and the only definitive way to rule out cancer.
20
 
Over the next several months, Castaneda‘s symptoms 
worsened but he did not receive the biopsy.
21
   
 The Division of Immigration Health Services‘ 
(hereinafter ―DIHS‖) records from November 14, reflect that 
Castaneda‘s ―symptoms have worsened, . . . he feels a 
constant pinching pain, . . . has blood and discharge on his 
shorts, . . . [and] complains of a swollen rectum.‖22 DIHS 
responded by prescribing Castaneda laxatives and increasing 
his weekly allotment of boxer shorts.
23
 On January 25, 2007, 
                                                          
16
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 684-85 (9th Cir. 2008). 
17
  Id. at 685. 
18
  Id.   
19
  Id.   
20
  Id. (emphasizing that the condition could worsen if the benign 
lesion is not promptly and properly treated).  Although the notes indicated 
that Castaneda should have been admitted for a biopsy, the DIHS 
physicians determined that this would be costly and decided not to pursue 
an outpatient biopsy.  Id. 
21
  Id. 
22
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 2008). 
23
  Id. at 686. Castaneda also complained that the lesion had grown 
and it was hard for him to stand and urinate because it would spray 
everywhere. Id.  Additionally, Castaneda complained that the lesion was 
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Castaneda was seen by another doctor who also ordered a 
biopsy after determining that Castaneda ―most likely [had] 
penile cancer.‖24 However, on February 5, instead of 
providing the biopsy, ICE released Castaneda, who then went 
to the emergency room of Harbor-UCLA Hospital in Los 
Angeles on February 8, where he was diagnosed with 
squamous cell carcinoma of the penis.
25
His penis was 
amputated on February 14, but the amputation did not occur 
in time to save Castaneda‘s life, as the cancer had 
metastasized and did not respond to numerous rounds of 
chemotherapy.
26
 Castaneda died on February 16, 2008 at the 
age of thirty-six.
27
 
 Castaneda‘s story is one of thousands involving detainees 
who are denied basic medical rights every day. Additionally, 
ICE detention centers are not the only ones with problems 
providing adequate medical care to its detainees.  Cuoco was 
a ―pre-trial detainee at FCI Otisville‖ Prison and a 
―preoperative male to female transsexual.‖28 Before she was 
arrested, she was receiving treatments for her gender 
transsexualism under a physician‘s supervision.29 Once 
Cuoco entered the prison, she informed the physician‘s 
assistant of her condition and at that time was allowed to 
keep her medication for self-administration.
30
   
                                                                                                                       
continuously leaking blood and pus, which stained his sheets and his 
underwear. Id.   
24
  Id.   
25
  Id. Most penile cancers are like Castaneda‘s, squamous cell 
carcinomas, which is described as ―cancer that begins in flat cells lining 
the penis.‖  See U.S. Nat‘l Inst. of Health, Penile Cancer, 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/penile (last visited Dec. 20, 
2009).   
26
  Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 686.   
27
  Id. at 686-87.  The cancer not only created ―a 4.5 centimeter-deep 
tumor in his penis‖, but it also spread to his lymph nodes and eventually 
throughout his body.  Id. at 686.  Even though Castaneda received 
chemotherapy for a year, it was not enough to save his life.  Id.   
28
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2000). 
29
  Id.  
30
  Id.  Cuoco at that time also told the physician‘s assistant that the 
dosage of her medicine will be lowered when her operation will take 
place.  Id.  Based on that information, she was allowed to keep ten tablets 
of hormones.  Id.   
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 On September 10, Cuoco met with a physician who called 
her ―the HE/SHE‖ and told her that he knew nothing about 
transsexuals and never diagnosed or treated them in his 
medical career.
31
  Although the physician agreed to renew 
Cuoco‘s prescription, he did only at a quarter the level that is 
required for her treatment.
32
 The Bureau of Prisons Health 
Services Manual states:  
 
It is the policy of the Bureau of Prisons to 
maintain the transsexual inmate at the level of 
change existing upon admission to the Bureau. 
Should responsible medical staff determine 
that either progressive or regressive treatment 
changes are indicated, these changes must be 
approved by the [Bureau of Prisons] Medical 
Director prior to implementation. The use of 
hormones to maintain secondary sexual 
characteristics may be continued at 
approximately the same levels as prior to 
incarceration, but such use must be approved 
by the Medical Director.
33
 
 
On September 17, Cuoco met with the same physician 
who told her that she would not be getting any more 
medication.
34
  Since she had not undergone the surgery she 
was not considered a true transsexual and the Bureau of 
Prisons policy only applied to true transsexuals.
35
 In 
response, Cuoco threatened suicide and ―began to suffer 
psychological and physical withdrawal symptoms resulting 
from the termination of the estrogen treatment.‖36   
                                                          
31
  Id. at 103-04.  The physician also asked Cuoco if she was planning 
to have surgery while in prison and after Cuoco told him that she didn‘t 
have any such plans, the physician decided to renew her medication.  Id.   
32
  Id. at 104. 
33
  Id. (citing Fed. Bureau of Prison Health Serv. Manual, § 6803 
(2008)).  
34
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2000). 
35
  Id. at 104. 
36
  Id.  Cuoco made several other suicide threats but instead of getting 
medical assistance, she was placed in isolation.  Id.  Furthermore, she was 
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 Both the cases discussed above were tried in appellate 
courts and even though both have similar circumstances of 
health officials denying the detainees their basic medical care 
and violating their constitutional rights, they had opposite 
holdings. In determining the question whether medical 
personnel can claim absolute immunity under the terms of the 
Public Health Service Act (hereinafter ―PHSA‖), the Second 
Circuit in Cuoco held in the affirmative,
37
 while the Ninth 
Circuit in Castaneda held in the negative.
38
 In determining 
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter ―FTCA‖) is 
the exclusive remedy for actions against members of the 
Public Health Service (hereinafter, ―PHS‖), the Second 
Circuit held in the affirmative,
39
 while the Ninth Circuit held 
in the negative.
40
 
 
III. LAW ON DETAINEES‘ RIGHTS 
 
A. Medical Rights Afforded to Detainees 
 
 The history of immigration detention centers goes as far 
back as the 1890s when up until that point immigrants were 
not detained while awaiting resolution of their legal status.
41
 
                                                                                                                       
harshly treated by stripping her down to her underwear and being forced 
to sleep in the cold.  Id.   
37
  Id. at 107.  ―We conclude that under its plain meaning, §233(a) 
covers the conduct of both Barraco and Moritsugu.‖  Id.   
38
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(The court concluded that §233 does not provide absolute immunity to 
public health service employees from constitutional claims.). 
39
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (7th Cir. 1980)) (―[W]hen defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and 
viewed as equally effective‘ the plaintiff is barred from bringing a Bivens 
action.‖).  The court found that FTCA is that alternative remedy.  Id.   
40
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 699 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding ―§233(a) does not explicitly declare the FTCA to be a substitute 
remedy for Bivens actions against the PHS officers and employees‖).   
41
  Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention 
in the U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (―The detention system is vast, ever-changing, and 
shrouded in secrecy.‖). 
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This changed in the 1890s with the opening of Ellis Island 
and the first immigration detention center.
42
 Ellis Island was 
closed in 1952 after Congress passed the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (hereinafter ―INA‖) which mandated that 
immigrants be detained only in cases where they posed a 
serious risk to security.
43
 In the 1990s, there was a major shift 
                                                                                                                       
 
Detention places extreme financial and emotional 
burdens on families by separating children, parents, 
siblings, and spouses from one another. One in five 
American families is of ―mixed‖ status with U.S. 
citizens, legal permanent residents and undocumented 
family members in one household.  When someone is 
detained it leaves a considerable impact on families and 
local communities – children become parentless, 
families lose their breadwinners, and jobs and 
community responsibilities become vacant.  
International law requires that the United States protect 
the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society. 
 
Id.   
42
  Id. (Detention is seen as the only way to ensure that immigrants 
appear for their court proceedings.).  International law prohibits arbitrary 
detention.  
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 9, requires that anyone who is deprived of 
liberty by arrest or detention should be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention 
and order release if the detention is not lawful. This 
right is guaranteed regardless of national origin.  
International law also requires that anyone deprived of 
liberty must be treated with humanity and respect for 
the inherent dignity of the person. 
 
Id.   
43
  Id. (According to the government, those immigrants who have 
criminal records pose serious security risks.).   
However, many times ―[t]he harshness of the detention 
and deportation system may force immigrants in the 
U.S. to go into hiding and live in fear.   Undocumented 
persons often do not seek help in emergencies or report 
crimes for fear of exposing themselves to immigration 
220 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
in immigration policy because detention centers were used as 
a primary means of enforcement regardless of whether the 
detainee posed any security threat.
44
 In 1994, the average 
daily population of a detention center was approximately 
5,000 detainees, but after September 11, 2001, the average 
daily population went up to 19,000 detainees and currently 
approximately 32,000 people are detained every day. 
45
 
 Even though the average daily population of detainees has 
tripled throughout the years, the amount of funds that the 
government spends on immigrant detainees‘ care, especially 
health care, has not even doubled.
46
 As a result, many 
detainees either suffer from injuries or die because of 
diseases.
47
 The ICE/DRO‘s Operations Manual regarding 
detainee‘s health care states: 
                                                                                                                       
authorities, making communities more unsafe.  Those 
escaping persecution in their home countries may also 
be deterred from applying for asylum, putting them at 
grave risk.‖  
 
Id.    
44
  Id. (Detention is known to be used as means to deter people from 
immigrating to the United States.). 
45
  Id. (―The detention and deportation of immigrants is a multi-
billion dollar industry.‖).  ICE‘s goal is to deport as many aliens as 
possible by the year 2012. Id.   
46
  Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention 
in the U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (addressing the small amount of funds spent on 
immigration detention center).  Many times detention is contracted out to 
private corporations who profit from detention by cutting corners.  Id.  
47
  Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention 
in the U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (addressing the lack of resources for immigrant 
detainees and the poor conditions along with abuses that have been 
reported in detention centers throughout the country);  Problems with 
Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International 
Law of the Comm. On the Judiciary House of Rep., 110th Cong. 1-2 
(2008) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, S. Comm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International 
Law), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:42722.pdf (There 
have been many reports by news agencies such as THE WASHINGTON 
POST or 60 MINUTES regarding medical care that is provided to detainees 
2010 Remedies for Detainees 221 
 
Detainees will have access to a continuum of 
health care services, including prevention, 
health education, diagnosis, and treatment. 
Health care needs will be met in a timely and 
efficient manner. Newly admitted detainees 
will be informed, orally and in writing, about 
how to access health services. . . A 
transportation system will be available that 
ensures timely access to health care services 
that are only available outside the facility, 
including: prioritization of medical need, 
urgency (such as the use of ambulance instead 
of standard transportation) and transfer of 
medical information. A detainee who requires 
close, chronic or convalescent medical 
supervision will be treated in accordance with 
a written plan approved by licensed physician, 
dentist, or mental health practitioner that 
includes directions to health care providers 
and other involved medical personnel. 
Detainees will have access to specified 24-
hour emergency medical, dental, and mental 
health services . . . . Detainees with chronic 
conditions will receive care and treatment for 
conditions where non-treatment would result 
in negative outcomes or permanent disability 
as determined by the clinical medical 
authority.
48
    
                                                                                                                       
at ICE immigration centers.).  Many of these reports include actual 
documents and interviews with government employees who have revealed 
all the information that the government tries to hide.  Id.  For example, at 
the San Pedro facility ―the clinical director prohibited medical staff from 
doing any lab work for detainees no matter what their condition until they 
had been detained for more than 30 days.‖  Id.   
48
  U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE/DRO Detention 
Standard: Medical Care, 1-3, (Dec. 2, 2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/PBNDS/pdf/medical_care.pdf; Detention 
Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention in the U.S., 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last visited Oct. 21, 
222 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
 
Even with the above guidelines, sick immigrant detainees 
are ―locked in a world of slow care, poor care and no care, 
with panic and cover-ups among employees watching it 
happen, according to a [Washington] Post investigation.‖49 
As a result, many immigrant detainees and their families have 
brought civil actions against the United States government 
and its employees.  
 
B. Actions against Government Employees in Medical 
Neglect Cases 
 
 The FTCA, passed by Congress in 1948, gave American 
citizens the right to sue the federal government.
50
 The FTCA 
allows a civil action to be brought against the United States 
government for money damages as a result of the loss of 
personal property, personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission by a government 
employee acting within the scope of their employment.
51
 The 
FTCA also allows civil claims to be brought against the 
federal government ―under circumstances where the United 
States, if acting as a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act or omission occurred.‖52  
                                                                                                                       
2009) (ICE standards are not strictly enforced in a majority of the 
detention centers, resulting in various human rights abuses.). 
49
  Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Careless Detention: System of 
Neglect, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/immigration/cwc_d1p1.html (Many of the detainees 
who are physically sick or even mentally ill are denied basic medical 
treatment which they are entitled to by law.). 
50
  Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 1346(b) (2006). 
51
  Id. 
52
  Id. (The FTCA allows claims to be brought forward for wrongful 
conduct of negligence, assault, battery, false imprisonment, abuse of 
process, and malicious prosecution.);  See American Bar Association, A 
Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other 
Law Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or 
Loss, II 1-2, 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
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In 1971, Congress passed the PHSA, which provides 
absolute immunity from suit for PHS employees.
53
 The 
PHSA states that the remedy against the United States 
provided in the Act precludes a remedy for damage of 
personal injury or death from the performance of medical or 
related functions by a commissioned officer or employee of 
the Public Health Service while acting within the scope of his 
office or employment.
 54
 Even though there were no remedies 
available for constitutional violations committed by federal 
agents, the Supreme Court had long held that federal courts 
had the power to grant relief not expressly authorized by 
statute as well as the power to adjust remedies to grant relief 
made necessary by the particular circumstances of the case at 
hand.
55
 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a violation of a specific 
constitutional amendment by a federal employee was 
recognized as a cause of action for monetary damages and the 
victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the 
Amendment itself, despite the lack of any federal statute 
authorizing such a suit.
56
 The existence of a remedy for the 
violation was implied from the importance of the right 
violated and without Bivens actions, the right to hold federal 
employees personally liable for malicious, vicious and even 
depraved actions is severely limited under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and subsequent revisions.
57
  
                                                                                                                       
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (Additionally, FTCA is usually interpreted as all 
claims are mainly resolved in the favor of the government of the U.S.). 
53
  Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §233(a) (2006). 
54
  Id.  
55
  Adele P. Kimmel, Conal Doyle & Thomas M. Dempsey, 
Litigating Medical Neglect Cases on Behalf of Immigrant Detainees: The 
Impact of the Ninth Circuit‘s Decision in Castaneda v. Henneford, 
http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/Litigating%20Medical%20
Neglect%20Cases%20on%20Behalf%20of%20Immigrant%20Detainees.
pdf. 
56
  Id. at 2. 
57
  Id. (asserting that Bivens created a civil rights cause of action 
against constitutional violations); A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS 
Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement 
Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, I, 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
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 In 1976, Estelle v. Gamble established three basic rights 
of prisoners to bring medical neglect claims under the Eighth 
Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause: (1) the 
right to access
 
to care, (2) the right to care that is ordered, and 
(3) the right to
 
a professional medical judgment.
58
 ―The right 
to access to care—emergency and routine, as well as 
specialists and hospitals when needed—is fundamental. 
When access is denied or delayed, the health staff does not 
know which patients need immediate attention and which 
need care that can wait. ‗A well-monitored and well-run 
access system is the best way to protect prisoners from 
unnecessary harm and suffering and, concomitantly, to 
protect prison officials from liability for denying access to 
needed medical care.‘‖59 
 In 1980, Carlson v. Green established a federal prisoner‘s 
right to bring a Bivens claim for medical neglect under the 
Eighth Amendment in addition to a suit under the FTCA.
60
 
Carlson also created an exception to this rule: a Bivens 
remedy will not be available when an alternative remedy is 
both declared as a substitute and is equally effective or in the 
presence of special factors which militate against a direct 
recovery remedy.  But in the case of Carlson, the Court held 
that there was nothing stated in the FTCA or its legislative 
history to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens 
                                                                                                                       
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (―INS detainees who have been injured due to the 
actions of federal officers before or during their stay in a federal, state, or 
local detention center may file BOTH a FTCA complaint against the 
United States and a Bivens complaint against individual officers at the 
same time in order to obtain monetary compensation for their injuries.‖).   
58
  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (emphasizing that 
deliberate indifference to a person‘s medical needs is an Eight 
Amendment violation).  
59
  William J. Rold, 30 Years After Estelle v. Gamble: A Legal 
Retrospective, National Commission on Correctional Health Care, 
http://www.ncchc.org/pubs/CC/legal_30years.html (last visited Oct. 20, 
2009) (citing E. Winner, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of 
Prison Medical Care, 1 J. OF PRISON HEALTH 67 (1981).  
60
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980) (asserting the various 
remedies available for medical rights violation).  
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remedy or create an equally effective remedy for 
constitutional violations.
61
 
 In 1988, Congress passed the Federal Employees Liability 
Reform and Tort Compensation Act (hereinafter, ―LRTCA‖), 
which states: 
 
(b)(1) The remedy against the United States 
provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this 
title for injury or loss of property, or personal 
injury or death arising or resulting from the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment 
is exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding for money damages by reason of 
the same subject matter against the employee 
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or 
against the estate of such employee. Any other 
civil action or proceeding for money damages 
arising out of or relating to the same subject 
matter against the employee or the employee's 
estate is precluded without regard to when the 
act or omission occurred. 
(b)(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply 
to a civil action against an employee of the 
Government— 
(A) which is brought for a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States, or  
(B) which is brought for a violation of a 
statute of the United States under which such 
action against an individual is otherwise 
authorized. 
62
 
 
  The LRTCA amended the FTCA to provide for the 
substitution of the United States as a defendant in any action 
                                                          
61
  Id. (arguing how there is an exception but the burden would fall on 
the defendant to meet the requirements).  
62
  Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988). 
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where one of its employees is sued for damages as a result of 
an alleged common law tort committed within the scope of 
his or her employment.
63
 Congress enacted the LRTCA to 
respond to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Westfall v. Erwin, which limited a federal official's absolute 
immunity from tort claims to situations where the official's 
actions were ―within the outer perimeter of an official's duties 
and . . . discretionary in nature.‖64 Congress saw the Westfall 
decision as an erosion of the common law tort immunity 
formerly available to federal employees and even though it 
acts as a general grant of immunity to government employees 
for all official acts, it clarifies that the general immunity does 
not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of 
the government.
65
  
 In Cuoco, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the District Court‘s dismissal of the action.66 The 
Second Circuit found that the prison medical director and 
chief medical officer were absolutely immune under the 
PHSA.
67
  Further, the Court held that a ―government official 
is entitled to qualified immunity from suit for actions taken as 
a government official if: (1) the conduct attributed to the 
official is not prohibited by federal law, constitutional or 
otherwise, (2) the plaintiff's right not to be subjected to such 
conduct by the official was not clearly established at the time 
of the conduct, or (3) the official's action was objectively 
legally reasonable in light of the legal rules that were clearly 
established at the time it was taken.‖68 The Second Circuit, 
                                                          
63
  Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679 (1988).  
64
  Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988). 
65
  Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988). 
66
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2000). 
67
  Id. at 109. 
68
  Id. at 107, 109, 112 (stating new exceptions to the claim against 
individual employees);  See American Bar Association, A Legal Guide for 
INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement 
Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, II-6, 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (The FTCA provides different definitions of 
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however, incorrectly applied the Carlson exception to a 
Bivens remedy and rejected the Bivens claim against the PHS 
officials.
69
  
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Castaneda held that PHS 
officials can be sued for violating an immigrant detainee‘s 
constitutional right to adequate medical care.
70
  After 
applying the two part test of Carlson, the Court held that the 
PHSA was not an alternative remedy to Bivens and was not 
equally effective to preempt Bivens.
71
 The Court also rejected 
the argument that FTCA is the exclusive remedy for 
unconstitutional conduct by government doctors and other 
PHS officials and keeping with its analysis, the Court 
permitted a Bivens claim against PHS employees.
72
  
 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
  
―[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖73   
 
A. The Second Circuit Erred in Rejecting the Bivens Claim 
 
  In Cuoco, the Appellate Court denied Cuoco‘s ―cruel and 
unusual punishment‖ claim because at the time the claim was 
filed, Cuoco was a pre-trial detainee and was not being 
punished.
74
 The Court however, did affirm the District 
                                                                                                                       
federal and local employees versus government contractors and which one 
can be brought a claim against.).   
69
  Cuoco, 222 F.3d 99 at 108. 
70
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2008). 
71
  Id. at 688.   
72
  Id.  
73
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (asserting that the constitution 
specifically uses the word person).  The constitution does not address the 
rights of citizens versus the rights of aliens.  Id.   
74
  Id. at 104 (justifying the reasons for the court‘s decisions); Weyant 
v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) (―In the context of a convicted 
prisoner, who has a right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishments, ‗[a] prison official‘s ‗deliberate 
indifference‘ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the 
Eighth Amendment.‘‖).    
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Court‘s decision of accepting the claim under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
75
 The Court applied 
the Fourteenth Amendment test developed in Weyant
76
 to the 
Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment.
77
 The Court 
concluded that Cuoco‘s action lied in the fact that because the 
medical staff denied her, ―an unconvicted detainee, 
‗treatment that [she] needed to remedy a serious medical 
condition and [they] did so because of their deliberate 
indifference to that need.‘‖78 Deliberate indifference is 
defined as ―something more than mere negligence‖ and proof 
of intent is not a requirement because the standard is 
―satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the 
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm 
will result.‖79 Although medical malpractice is not ordinarily 
                                                          
75
  Id. at 106 (explaining how the court applied the Bivens remedy to 
this claim); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic 
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.21 (1987) (quoting Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975)) (stating that the equal 
protection analysis is the same as under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).   
76
  Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) (referring to the 
medical portion of the test).  ―Now, as far as the medical care is 
concerned, the plaintiff must show that the deprivation was sufficiently 
serious and it was unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.‖ Id. at 851.  
77
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) (Since the defendants 
were federal rather than state officers, a Bivens remedy under Fifth 
Amendment is more appropriate.). 
78
  Id.; Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(―Courts have repeatedly held that treatment of a psychiatric or 
psychological condition may present a ‗serious medical need‘ . . . . There 
is no reason to treat transsexualism differently than any other psychiatric 
disorder. Thus . . . plaintiff‘s complaint does state a ‗serious medical 
need.‘‖); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving the 
description of transsexualism as a psychiatric disorder)).    
79
  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (defining what 
constitutes deliberate indifference); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 
702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 
(1994)) (―An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when 
the official ―knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 
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deliberate indifference, it can be if it involves recklessness, 
for example an officer‘s conscious act or failure to act which 
leads to a substantial risk of harm.
80
 
 However, the Second Circuit granted the defendant‘s 
motion for summary judgment based on their analysis of the 
PHSA.
81
 The Court looked at the plain meaning of the Act 
and concluded that ―[t]he complained behavior of these 
defendants thus occurred within the scope of their offices or 
employment and during the course of their ‗performance of 
medical . . . or related functions‘‖ and as such are absolutely 
immune from any claims against them.
82
 In addition, the 
Court stated that Cuoco‘s exclusive remedy for injuries 
caused by the defendant‘s behavior is against the United 
States under the FTCA.
83
 To reach this conclusion, the Court 
relied on dicta in Carlson stating that ‗―when defendants 
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which 
it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly 
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective‘ the 
plaintiff is then barred from bringing a Bivens action.‖84 The 
                                                                                                                       
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must 
also draw the inference.‘‖).  
80
  Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 n.14 (1976)). 
81
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 105-12 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(addressing the court‘s decision in granting summary judgment).   The 
court has often applied the Eighth Amendments‘ indifference test to pre-
trial detainees bringing action under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 106.  
82
  Id. at 107 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)) (analyzing the court‘s 
reasons for granting immunity because they are acting within their 
capacity as government officers); id. (quoting Cheung v. United States, 
213 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000)) (―In construing the terms of a statute, we 
look first to its language to ascertain its plain meaning.‖).  
83
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing 
the court‘s decision to discount Bivens remedy); Id. (quoting Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)) (―‗[T]he denial of a substantial claim 
of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the 
essence of absolute immunity is its possessor‘s entitlement not to have to 
answer for his conduct in civil damages action.‘‖).   
84
  Id. at 108 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980)); 
Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000) (―In construing 
the terms of a statute, we look first to its language to ascertain its plain 
meaning.‖).   
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Court read this to imply that the PHSA created FTCA as an 
expressly declared substitute for Bivens.
85
 In Carlson, the 
Supreme Court wrote that its conclusion that the FTCA 
complements Bivens, rather than replaces it, is supported by 
the ―significant fact that Congress follows the practice of 
explicitly stating what it means to make the FTCA an 
exclusive remedy.‖86   
 Even though Cuoco argued that the FTCA is an 
inadequate remedy because it only provides for declaratory 
relief and not injunctive relief, the Court disregarded that 
argument.
87
 Further, since Cuoco was no longer a pre-trial 
detainee, no longer incarcerated at the prison, her estrogen 
problem was resolved, and she made no claims that the 
defendants would deny her necessary treatments in the future, 
the Court decided that Cuoco‘s argument was moot.88 In fact, 
the Court stated that if Cuoco could prove that either of the 
defendants violated her constitutional rights in the course of 
something other than the performance of medical or related 
functions, or while acting outside of the scope of their 
employment, they would not be provided with absolute 
immunity.
89
 To defend this argument, the Court applied 
several principles of immunity, one of which is that: ―[a] 
government official is entitled to qualified immunity from 
suit for actions taken as a government official if (1) the 
conduct attributed to the official is not prohibited by the 
federal law, constitutional or otherwise; (2) the plaintiff‘s 
right not be subjected to such conduct by the official was not 
clearly established at the time of the conduct; or (3) the 
official‘s action was objectively legally reasonable in light of 
                                                          
85
  Id.   
86
  Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).  
87
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2000).  
88
  Id.  Cuoco also alleged that Barraco and Moritsugu were 
inexperienced doctors and that‘s why they prescribed the wrong course of 
treatment.  Id. at 107.   
89
  Id. at 109. ―Public Health Service officers or employees are 
protected from suits that sound in medical malpractice.‖ Id. at 108 
(quoting Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1984)).   
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the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was 
taken.‖90  
 In addition, when Cuoco tried to raise the defense that the 
defendants should have interjected when she was denied her 
medication, the Court held that ―the absence of a factual 
predicate for the allegations against defendants . . . leads to 
the conclusion that these defendants are named in the action 
solely because of their supervisory positions.  In a Bivens 
action, such a respondeat superior theory will not suffice.‖91 
Cuoco also tried to raise awareness to the fact that the health 
officials were indifferent when they made inappropriate 
statements such as calling her a ―HE/SHE‖, but the Court 
held that rudeness and name calling is not a violation of 
constitutional rights.
92
 Cuoco tried to appeal the decision by 
claiming that these defendants were not just named for their 
supervisory capacity but that they actually were in a position 
to intervene when Cuoco was denied her medicine and 
instead treated her with deliberate indifference.
93
  Even 
though Cuoco‘s ―failure to intervene‖ claim should have 
survived the defendant‘s motion to dismiss, the Court 
nonetheless affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants 
because they were entitled to qualified immunity.
94
   
Furthermore, the District Court in Cuoco‘s case stated 
that even though Cuoco had tried to raise a claim against the 
federal prison‘s policy maker, she was unsuccessful even 
though a policy maker in its supervisory capacity has the 
authority to declare which rules should be followed and if 
that person ―created a policy or custom under which 
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy 
or custom to continue, [or] . . . if he or she was grossly 
negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful 
condition or event,‖ then that person would be held liable, but 
                                                          
90
  Id. at 109. 
91
  Id. at 110.  
92
  Id. at 109; Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(stating what is not considered constitutional violation).  
93
  Id. at 110.  
94
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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in this case there was not sufficient evidence to hold that 
policy maker liable.
95
 
 The Court in Cuoco also failed to discuss whether 
Congress viewed the remedies provided under the FTCA as 
"equally effective" as those provided under Bivens, a question 
that the Carlson Court explicitly answered in the negative.
96
 
Under Carlson, compliance with its "equally effective" prong 
is a necessary pre-condition for holding a statutory remedy to 
be a substitute for a Bivens cause of action and thus, Cuoco's 
failure to address that prong or the answer provided by 
Carlson is contrary to governing Supreme Court precedent.  
 
B. The Ninth Circuit was Correct in its Rulings Regarding a 
Bivens Claim. 
 
 The scope of the PHSA‘s immunity presents an important 
federal question.  Although the Second Circuit in Cuoco 
concluded that this Act makes the FTCA the exclusive 
remedy for damage claims arising out of medical related care 
provided by federal PHS officers,
97
 they erred in their 
holding.  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis and 
application of the Carlson test in Castaneda led to the 
conclusion that the PHSA does not make FTCA the exclusive 
remedy and it certainly does not preclude an action under 
Bivens.
98
  
 In Castaneda, a constitutional rights violation and 
medical malpractice action was brought against the United 
States government under the FTCA and against several 
federal officials and medical personnel under Bivens.
99
 After 
Castaneda‘s death, his sister and daughter, substituting 
                                                          
95
  Id. at 109 (quoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d 
Cir. 1986)).  
96
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (stressing how court 
disregarded the comparison of Bivens and FTCA).  
97
  Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2000). 
98
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(asserting that Carlson was correct in its conclusion).  
99
  Id. at 687; BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004) (The 
term malpractice means negligence or incompetence in performing one‘s 
professional duties.).  
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themselves as plaintiffs, brought additional claims under the 
California Wrongful Death Statute seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages.
100
  
 When addressing the question of whether the PHSA 
really did make the FTCA an exclusive remedy and 
precluded a Bivens claim, the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
precedent.
101
 In Carlson, the Supreme Court stated the 
situations in which a Bivens claim can be defeated.
102
 First, if 
a defendant shows ―special factors counseling hesitation in 
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.‖103 Second, if 
the defendant demonstrates that ―Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy which is explicitly declared to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and 
viewed as equally effective‖ as a Bivens claim.104 
 The facts of the Carlson case closely resemble the facts of 
Castaneda. In Carlson, a deceased federal prisoner‘s mother 
brought suit on behalf of her son against the prison officials 
whose deliberate indifference to her son‘s serious medical 
condition caused his death, thus, violating his Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment.
105
 The defendants in that case argued that the 
FTCA provided a substitute remedy to Bivens and the Court 
rejected that argument by stating that no statute declared the 
FTCA to be a substitute for Bivens and the legislative history 
confirms that Congress views the FTCA and Bivens as 
complimentary causes of action.
106
 Similarly, in Castaneda, 
Castaneda died due to deliberate indifference on the part of 
the PHS officials in regards to his medical condition and once 
again, a cause of action alleging Fifth and Eighth Amendment 
                                                          
100
  Id. at 687. 
101
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
102
  Id.  
103
  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). 
104
  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).  
105
  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16. 
106
  Id. at 19-20; id. at 16 n.1 (This case involved an equal protection 
claim stating that petitioner‘s ―indifference was in part attributable to 
racial prejudice.‖). 
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violations was brought and the defendants argued that the 
FTCA substitutes any Bivens remedy.
107
   
 To reach its decision, the Court in Castaneda first looked 
at whether the PHSA really establishes the ―FTCA as a 
substitute remedy for Bivens.‖108 As mentioned above, the 
Court in Carlson established a two part test that can preempt 
a Bivens remedy: first, Congress must provide an alternative 
remedy which is to be a substitute for a Bivens remedy; 
second, Congress must view that alternate remedy as equally 
effective as the Bivens remedy.
109
  
  When analyzing the first part of the Carlson test, the 
Castaneda Court looked to the text of the PHSA, which by its 
plain language does not declare the FTCA to be a substitute 
for Bivens actions against PHS personnel.
110
  Moreover, the 
statute‘s title, ―Defense of Certain Malpractice and 
Negligence Suits‖ indicates that Congress wanted to extend 
immunity to common law malpractice and negligence actions 
and not to actions alleging constitutional violations, thereby 
leading the U.S. Supreme Court to reject the defendant‘s 
argument that the language in the statute extended toward 
actions claiming constitutional violations.
111
 In addition, the 
PHSA was enacted by Congress six months before Bivens 
was decided and furthermore, it predates Estelle v. Gamble 
by six years, where a remedy under the Eighth Amendment 
for deliberate indifference to prisoner‘s serious medical needs 
was established.
112
 Therefore, the Court concluded that 
Congress did not have the desire to substitute Bivens with the 
FTCA when the thing being substituted did not exist at the 
time.
113
   
 Moreover, the Court analyzed the legislative history of 
the PHSA and concluded that Congress only intended for the 
                                                          
107
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2008); 
id. at 688 n.6 (The only difference is that unlike the Plaintiff in Carlson 
who was a criminal convict, Castaneda was an immigrant detainee.).  
108
  Id. at 689.  
109
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). 
110
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2008). 
111
  Id. at 693-4.  
112
  Id. at 693.  
113
  Id. at 692.  
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immunity to extend to common law malpractice and 
negligence actions and not Bivens actions.
114
 This conclusion 
that Congress views the FTCA as parallel and not a substitute 
to a Bivens remedy is signified by the fact that Congress 
would have explicitly stated if it meant to make FTCA claims 
a substitute for Bivens actions. ―An ordinary reader, at the 
time of [the PHSA‘s] passage, would have understood ‗any 
other civil action or proceeding‘ with respect to ‗personal 
injury, including death, resulting from the performance of 
medical, surgical, dental or related functions‘ to refer instead 
to a host of common law and statutory malpractice 
actions.‖115 In fact, the Supreme Court in Estelle 
differentiated between a malpractice suit and an Eighth 
Amendment violation suit.
116
 The Court in Estelle found that 
―[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional 
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.  In order to 
state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or 
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs.‖117 Although a claim 
arising from a constitutional violation might be appropriate 
for malpractice, the two are still very different from each 
other.  
 In fact, when Congress passed the LRTCA in 1988, it 
extended the FTCA‘s immunity to government employees for 
all acts whether within the scope of their official duties or not 
and it specifically clarified that the general immunity ―does 
not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of 
the Government which is brought for a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.‖118 Through this Act, 
Congress confirmed the Court‘s holding in Carlson, that 
                                                          
114
  Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2008). 
115
  Id. at 693 (citing oral argument). 
116
  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  
117
  Id.   
118
  Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (1988).  
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constitutional claims are outside the scope of the FTCA and it 
certainly does not preempt a Bivens remedy.
119
   
 The second part of Carlson‘s two-part test provides that 
Congress must view the alternate remedy as ―equally 
effective‖ as a Bivens remedy and although the defendants in 
Castaneda argued that the FTCA is that alternate remedy, the 
Court looked at the preceding Supreme Court case of 
Carlson, in which the Court held the opposite: Congress did 
not view FTCA as an alternate remedy and certainly not as 
effective as Bivens remedy.
120
 In fact, Carlson stated four 
reasons for the FTCA not being as effective as the Bivens 
remedy.
121
 First, damages under Bivens are awarded against 
individual federal employees while damages under FTCA are 
awarded against the United States government and in this 
manner Bivens is more effective because the threat of 
financial liability has a deterrent effect on individual 
employees.
122
 Second, punitive damages are not awarded 
under FTCA, while Bivens allows for punitive damages 
thereby further deterring employees from violating 
individual‘s constitutional rights.123  
 Third, unlike the FTCA, a Bivens remedy permits a 
plaintiff to request a jury trial.
124
 Fourth, liability under the 
FTCA is limited by ―the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred‖ and in fact, the Carlson Court stated that 
this last factor is an important one because under the FTCA, a 
plaintiff‘s action can fail depending on the law of the forum 
                                                          
119
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (examining legislative 
history to determine whether Congress viewed it as a substitute or 
complementary remedy).  
120
  Id. at 18-20.  
121
  Id. at 21. 
122
  Id. at n.7 (―Indeed, underlying the qualified immunity which 
public officials enjoy for actions taken in good faith is the fear that 
exposure to personal liability would otherwise deter them from acting at 
all.‖). 
123
  Id. at 21-22; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978) 
(However, there have been times where courts have not awarded punitive 
damages because it found that the defendants ―did not act with a 
malicious intention to deprive respondents of their rights or to do them 
other injury.‖). 
124
  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22. 
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state thus motivating a Bivens remedy.
125
 The Court 
emphasized that ―only a uniform federal rule of survivorship 
will suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation here 
alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.‖126 
Keeping the above in mind, the Court in Castaneda 
emphasized that if Castaneda‘s remedy was available only 
under the FTCA, then Castaneda would have to face many 
hurdles depending on state law to bring a suit in the first 
place and based on Carlson‘s holding, specifically that the 
FTCA is not ―equally effective‖ as Bivens, the Castaneda 
Court held that the PHSA does not preempt Bivens remedy.
127
  
                                                          
125
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23 (1980) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b) (1997)); id. at 17-18 n.4 (Depending on the state law, certain 
personal injury claims would not survive and especially if a decedent was 
not survived by a spouse or a dependent next of kin.);  A.B.A., A Legal 
Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law 
Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, II 
3, http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (Additionally, monetary damages which are 
controlled by state law are limited to money damages and that ―include 
reasonable compensation for personal injury or loss of property.‖). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may be 
entitled to monetary compensation for ―loss of 
enjoyment of life.‖  These damages must be based 
solely on a government employee‘s simple negligence, 
NOT on the government employee‘s intentional or 
egregious conduct.  However, state law determines how 
much money may be recovered and whether the loss of 
enjoyment of life claim fits within the state‘s definition 
of compensatory damages.   
 
Id. (citing Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 303-4 (1992)).   
126
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23 (1980). 
127
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 691 (9th Cir. 2008); 
American Bar Association, A Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions 
Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement Officials for Personal 
Injury or Property Damage or Loss, II 4, 
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
 
Additionally, FTCA has many exceptions and if any exception applies to 
the situation the case will be automatically dismissed for lacking 
jurisdiction.  Following are exceptions and exclusions in FTCA:  
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 Since the defendant failed to meet Carlson‘s two part test, 
the Court in Castaneda then looked for any ―special factors‖ 
precluding a Bivens remedy by stating that ―where Congress 
fails to explicitly declare a remedy to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution or to provide a 
remedy that is as effective a remedy for constitutional tort, a 
Bivens action may still be precluded.‖128 The Court in 
Carlson noted that a Bivens action can be defeated if the 
                                                                                                                       
 
Foreign Country Exception: If a detainee‘s injuries 
occurred outside the United States, no FTCA claim may 
be made.   
 
Intentional Torts Exception: Only investigative or law 
enforcement officers may be sued for intentional torts 
like ―assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, and abuse of process.  FTCA suits for 
intentional torts against individuals who are NOT law 
enforcement INS employees are prohibited.  
 
Other Torts Excluded from the FTCA: Libel 
(publication of something that injuries the reputation of 
another person); slander (saying something that injures 
the reputation of another person); misrepresentation 
(telling you something untrue); deceit; or interference 
with contracts.  
 
Detention of Goods Exclusion: Any claim arising from 
the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other 
property by any customs or tax officer or any law 
enforcement officer is excluded.  
 
Discretionary Function Exception: Precludes suits 
―based upon an act or omission of any employee of the 
Government, exercising due care in the execution of a 
statute or regulation, or based upon the performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary duty.‖  
Detention decisions that are not directly mandated by 
statute are discretionary and fit within the exception.  
For example, a detention facility‘s policy decision to 
require sick or injured detainees to go to hospitals rather 
than to receive in-house treatment is discretionary.   
 
Id. at II 4-5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006)). 
128
  Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 700 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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defendant shows any ‗―special factors‘ counseling hesitation 
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.‖129  
 Although the Castaneda Court recognized that after 
Carlson, the Supreme Court has found other remedial 
schemes to be ―special factors‖ precluding Bivens relief, the 
Court noted that none of those decisions has ―overruled 
Carlson‘s square holding that there are no special factors that 
preclude a Bivens action in a case whose facts and posture 
mirror this one.‖130 Therefore, Carlson‘s holding that the 
FTCA is not a ―special factor‖ precluding Bivens relief 
remains good law and compelled the Court in Castaneda to 
reject the defendant‘s arguments.131 In any event, Congress 
has taken ―affirmative action‖ with respect to the point 
argued by the defendants in Castaneda by expressly 
preserving a Bivens action against all federal employees 
under the LRTCA and thus, there is no ―absence of 
affirmative action from Congress‖ that would warrant 
examining the ―special factors‖ test.132   
 For all the reasons stated above, Castaneda‘s holding is 
consistent with that of Carlson‘s. Carlson places the burden 
on defendants to show an explicit declaration from Congress 
that the PHSA precludes Bivens claims.
133
 The Court in 
Castaneda followed that directive and conducted an 
extensive analysis of the language, the historical context, and 
legislative history of both the PHSA and the LRTCA, 
concluding that Congress did not intend the PHSA to bar the 
Bivens action against PHS medical personnel.
134
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                          
129
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (quoting Bivens, 403 
U.S. at 396).   
130
  Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997)) (―The 
presence of a deliberately crafted statutory remedial system is one ‗special 
factor‘ that precludes a Bivens remedy.‖).  
131
  Id. at 701.  
132
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
133
  Id. at 18-9.  
134
  Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 700-02 (9th Cir. 2008).  
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 Although Francisco Castaneda‘s story is tragic, it is not 
unique.
135
 Every day, there are thousands of immigrants 
placed in privately run ICE detention facilities around the 
country who are unable to access appropriate medical and 
mental health support or services.
136
 In fact, the ―most 
common complaints from detainees in the United States is 
‗severe and widespread problems‘ with access to medical 
care.‖137 The fact that necessary medical treatments have 
been denied to detainees is supported by documents 
specifically stating ―the amount of money ICE saved by 
denying requests for treatment‖ such as ―requests which were 
all submitted by on-site medical personnel . . .  for such 
things as tuberculosis, pneumonia, bone fractures, head 
trauma, chest pain, and other serious complaints‖ and it is 
                                                          
135
  Francisco Castaneda, Presentation on Medical Care and Deaths 
in ICE Custody, 
http:/www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file841_32062.pdf (2007). 
 
I had to be here today because I am not the only one 
who didn‘t get the medical care I needed. It was a 
routine for detainees to have to wait weeks or months to 
get even basic care.  Who knows how many tragic 
endings can be avoided if ICE will only remember that, 
regardless of why a person is in detention and 
regardless of where they will end up, they are still 
human and deserve basic, humane medical care.  
 
Id.   
136
  Paul Wayner, Prisoners without Convicts: Why Similar 
Protections As Those Offered to Prison Inmates By the Constitution 
Should be Extended to Immigrant Detainees, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=paul
_wayner (Apr. 13, 2009). 
137
  Id. (arguing the reasons for extending constitutional rights to 
immigrant detainees).  There are many problems that occur in regards to 
medical attention that detainees need such as no sick forms to inform the 
medical personnel, late response to sometimes no response at all to 
medical requests, etc.  Id.  These types of problems lead to ―delay in 
detection or treatment of medical conditions.‖ Id.  Many times, mental 
health patients are not given medical attention or even if they are given 
medication, it has been changed to a generic form or different dosage of 
medicine or a different type of medicine altogether. Id.  This leads to 
many problems and ―adversely affect the mental stability of the detainee 
and the institution and can inhibit effective legal representation.‖ Id.    
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absurd ―[h]ow an off-site bureaucrat can deny a request to 
treat tuberculosis or a bone fracture….‖138   
Although the United States Constitution does not give an 
immigrant a constitutional right to enter the country, it does 
provide immigrants with certain basic rights when they are 
within the borders of this country.
139
 Among these rights are 
the right to counsel,
140
 a right to due process,
141
 a right to 
equal protection under the law,
142
 and protection from cruel 
and unusual punishment.
143
 When these rights have been 
violated, there are remedies that are afforded to these 
immigrants.
144
     
 The federal government has created national guidelines 
that ―intend to set a standard of consistent care and fair 
treatment for detainees in immigrant custody.‖145 In fact, 
                                                          
138
  Problems with Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border 
Security, and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of 
Rep., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, 
S. Comm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and 
International Law), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:42722.pdf; 
Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention in the 
U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last visited Oct. 
21, 2009) (―Detention and deportation are extreme and punitive measures 
for individuals going through a civil administrative process. The very act 
of detention attaches a stigma of criminalization to immigrants and 
enmeshes them in the U.S. criminal justice system.‖).   
139
  A.C.L.U., The Rights of Immigrants, American Civil Liberties 
Union, The Rights of Immigrants, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rights-immigrants-aclu-position-
paper (2000) (Laws punishing immigrants without just cause violate their 
right to fair and equal treatment.).  
140
  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
141
  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
142
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see A.C.L.U., The Rights of 
Immigrants, available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rights-
immigrants-aclu-position-paper (2000) (Constitutional rights apply to 
every person within the U.S. border including Aliens.). 
143
  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
144
  A.C.L.U., The Rights of Immigrants, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rights-immigrants-aclu-position-
paper (2000). 
145
  U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Performance 
Based National Detention Standards, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm 
242 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
there are forty-two detailed standards that outline specific 
directions relating to things such as dietary needs, medical 
access, telephone use, etc.
146
   However, since ICE guidelines 
are not codified, the law does not enforce them, and the lack 
of binding guidelines curtails the agency‘s accountability in 
protecting immigrant detainees‘ rights. Nevertheless, 
throughout the years there have been remedies made 
available to immigrants who bring forth claims of violation of 
their rights.    
 Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the 
Castaneda case, it should consider the two compelling 
arguments of the Ninth Circuit and affirm and recognize 
Congress‘s desire to preserve a Bivens claim against PHS 
employees. In particular, the Supreme Court should consider 
the fact that contrary to the Second Circuits holding in 
Cuoco, the Ninth Circuit in Castaneda affirmed that the 
PHSA does not provide immunity to PHS employees based 
on an analysis of the plain language of the Act.
147
 The Ninth 
Circuit applied the Carlson test to the PHSA and considered 
whether Congress had provided an alternative remedy to 
Bivens that it declared to be a substitute for rather than 
complimentary to Bivens; and if it had, whether Congress had 
viewed that remedy as equally effective to a Bivens 
                                                                                                                       
(2008) (―ICE‘s mission is to protect the security of the American people 
and homeland by vigilantly enforcing the nation‘s immigration and 
customs laws.‖); Problems with Immigration Detainee Medical Care: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security, and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary 
House of Rep., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, 
Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border 
Security, and International Law), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:42722.pdf. 
(Documents tell us that employees complained of certain policies that 
appear to be in violation of ICE‘s detention standards . . .  [d]ocuments 
show that ICE‘s policy may be designed to deny care and save money 
rather than to provide care and save lives.‖).  
146
  U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Performance 
Based National Detention Standards, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm 
(2008).  
147
  Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 692 (9th Cir. 2008).  
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remedy.
148
 The Ninth Circuit, after its detailed analysis, held 
in the negative to both questions considered above.
149
 It also 
considered the historical context of the statute and the 
legislative history to support its conclusion.
150
   
 The Supreme Court has two compelling reasons for 
affirming the Ninth Circuit‘s holding and recognizing 
Congress‘s intent to preserve the Bivens remedy against PHS 
employees. It should consider and appreciate the Ninth 
Circuit‘s analysis and the PHSA‘s legislative history and 
historical context. In addition, the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis of 
the Carlson test is far more compelling than the contrary 
analysis of the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit did not 
even perform a proper analysis because it did not recognize 
the difference between a medical negligence claim and a 
constitutional violation claim. Furthermore, the Second 
Circuit did not address how the LRTCA exempts Bivens 
claims from the FTCA‘s exclusion provision.  
 Therefore, the Supreme Court has strong reasons for 
affirming the Ninth Circuit‘s holding. This will not only 
encourage immigrant detainees to bring forth claims of their 
constitutional violations but will in fact hold accountable the 
PHS employees who are deliberately indifferent to the 
constitutional rights of these immigrant detainees. In fact, 
since there is a split in the Circuit Courts on this issue, the 
Supreme Court decision will promote national uniformity 
because just as other federal employees are subject to Bivens 
actions so too are the PHS employees. 
                                                          
148
  Id. at 688. 
149
  Id. at 692-99; id. at 700 (quoting Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 
988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997)) (―The presence of a deliberately crafted 
statutory remedial system is one ‗special factor‘ that precludes a Bivens 
remedy.‖). 
150
  Id.   
